1 Private Gated Communities in the American Urban Fabric: Emerging Trends in their Production, Practices, and Regulation by Evan McKenzie Political Science Department University of Illinois at Chicago 1007 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 USA voice: 312-413-3782 fax: 312-413-0440 mckenzie@uic.edu Presented at conference on “Gated Communities: Building Social Division or Safer Communities?” 18-19 September 2003, Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, Scotland 2 Pomoerium Article by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph.D, F.R.S.E, Rector of the High School of Edinburgh on pp930-931 of William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D.: A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, John Murray, London, 1875. POMOERIUM. manner as pomeridiem of post and meridiem, and thus signifies a line running by the walls of a town (pone or post muros). The pomoerium, however, did not consist of the actual walls or fortifications of a place, but was a symbolical wall, and the course of the pomoerium itself was marked by stone pillars (cippi pomoerii, Varro, ed. Müller), erected at certain intervals. The custom of making a pomoerium was common to the Latins and Etruscans, and the manner in which it was done in the earliest times, when a town was to be founded, was as follows: — A bullock and a heifer were yoked to a plough, and a furrow was drawn around the place which was to be occupied by the new town, in such a manner that all the clods fell inward. The little mound thus formed was the symbolical wall, and along it ran the pomoerium, within the compass of which alone the city-auspices (auspicia urbana) could be taken (Varro, That the actual walls or fortifications of a town ran near it, may naturally be supposed, though the pomoerium might either be within or without them. This custom was also followed in the building of Rome, and the Romans afterwards observed it in the establishment of their colonies. The sacred line of the Roman pomoerium did not prevent the inhabitants from building upon or taking into use any place beyond it, but it was necessary to leave a certain space on each side of it unoccupied so as not to unhallow it by profane use (Liv. i.44). 3 Introduction Privately governed residential enclaves known as common interest housing developments (CIDs), many of them gated and walled, are the predominant form of new housing in America’s fastest growing cities and suburbs. Over the last 25 years, this massive privatization of local government functions has changed the appearance and organizational structure of American urban areas. This trend is not a passing fashion but an institutional transformation reflecting the ideological shift toward privatism characteristic of the neoliberal consensus. Specifically, the CID revolution is driven by three main forces. Developers pursue higher density in order to maintain profits despite rising land costs. Local governments seek growth and increased tax revenues with minimal public expenditure. And many middle and upper class home-buyers, fearful of crime and disenchanted with government, are in search of a privatized utopia—or, as I call it, privatopia--offering security, a homogenous population, and managerial private government. This transformation resembles the construction of a physical and institutional or sanctified wall, around the affluent portions of an increasingly divided society. Nowhere in the United States is this transformation more visible than in Las Vegas, Nevada--the fastest growing city in the nation, and one that exemplifies the national and global trend toward placing tourism at the center of the urban economy and reshaping the spatial, social, and political order accordingly. Las Vegas area local governments require developers to construct virtually all new housing in CIDs, and gated security developments are popular. So popular, in fact, that non-CID neighborhoods come under pressure to emulate CIDs. One such neighborhood, Bonanza Village, was literally walled in by the City of Las Vegas, over the protest of many of its residents, in order to make the old neighborhood resemble contemporary gated communities and thus link it with downtown redevelopment. This episode illuminates the interplay of public and private forces that are reshaping American cities. I deeply appreciate the assistance of Monica Caruso and Anthony Caruso of Las Vegas, who spent a great deal of time assembling the documents on the Bonanza Village episode that enabled me to tell that story here. The photographs of Bonanza Village and the surrounding area which accompany the Powerpoint presentation of this paper were taken on May 16, 2001, by Monica Caruso. PRODUCTION: RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND GATED COMMUNITIES Privately governed residential enclaves known as common interest housing developments (CIDs), about one-fifth of them gated and walled (Blakely and Snyder 1997, 180n1) are the predominant form of new housing in America’s fastest growing cities and suburbs. Over the last 25 years, this massive privatization of local government functions, consisting of over 200,000 housing developments containing at least one-eighth of the nation’s population, has changed the appearance and organizational structure of American urban areas. Common interest housing includes planned developments of single family homes, townhouses, and condominiums. These developments involve a form of ownership in which home buyers purchase both an individual interest in a particular unit and another interest, consisting often of streets, recreation centers, golf courses, and other facilities, which they own in common with all residents in the development. They buy their property subject to voluminous 4 sets of deed restrictions, rules, and regulations, under which all owners agree to make monthly payments to a homeowner association, a private government into which all residents are enlisted at the moment of purchase. The association is run by the residents, supported by cadres of lawyers and other professionals, and it enforces the deed restrictions against all residents and manages the use of property and other aspects of life in the development. Increasingly, CID housing involves homeowner association-administered security measures, which typically include walls and gates, and may involve hiring guards and even private police forces. There is considerable disagreement over the causes and effects of this phenomenon. I have argued that the CID revolution is driven by the motivations of developers and local governments on the supply side, and consumers on the demand side, with the supply side interests predominating over the demand side. (McKenzie 1998a) Developers have found that CIDs help them pursue higher density, in order to maintain profits despite rising land costs. They can put more people on less land, and also provide amenities to buyers, by creating common ownership of parks, swimming pools, and so forth. Local governments seek growth and increased tax revenues with minimal public expenditure. CIDs privatize what would otherwise be government responsibilities and place these burdens in the hands of homeowner associations, whose members pay for them through monthly assessments. These associations arrange for trash collection, plow snow in the winter and move leaves in the fall, repair and light streets, run parks, and do many other things that government would otherwise have to do in order to enjoy the increase d tax revenues from new development. Thus cities can acquire new property tax payers without having to extend to them the full panoply of municipal services. But the demand for such a lifestyle cannot be ignored. Many middle and upper class home-buyers, fearful of crime and disenchanted with government, are in search of a privatized utopia offering security, a homogenous population, and small-scale managerial private government that enforces high standards of property maintenance. For many people, the gated community is especially attractive, as it adds fortification to all the other attributes of CID living. I have argued that the rise of residential private government facilitates the emergence of a two tier society in which the “haves” are increasingly separated—spatially, institutionally, socially, and economically—from those of lesser means. I call this realm “privatopia” because it represents the pursuit of utopian aspirations through privatization of public life. And within privatopia the terms and conditions of life are at odds with the norms and expectations of liberal democracy. Residential private governments, known generically as “homeowner associations,” are not restricted by conventional notions of civil liberties and due process of law, and their activities are supported by a powerful cadre of professionals, including lawyers, property managers, accountants, and others. Yet, many observers see the situation quite differently. Some argue that the CID revolution is merely a manifestation of consumer sovereignty, representing the collective preferences of millions of home buyers. This demand side logic reaches its greatest extent with the libertarian justification of homeowner associations as private protective associations, a view anticipate d in Robert Nozick’s major work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia . By this logic, discussion of the social effects of these millions of individual choices is largely irrelevant, because principles of individual liberty that govern the choices justify the end result. The related “caveat emptor” argument is generally persuasive to American courts, reflecting the view that each individual owner should be bound by the terms of her contract, and that the state should not interfere to remake that agreement. I have considered this argument elsewhere (McKenzie 1998b) and argued that the premises for the caveat emptor perspective often do not apply, because in many cases the contracts that create homeowner associations are in reality adhesion contracts, the terms of which are incomprehensible to the average buyer and non-negotiable in any event. In any event, it seems to me that the social and political consequences of private residential government are too significant to be left to individual market choices. 5 The homeowner association is not a passing fashion but an important institution reflecting the ideological shift toward privatism that is characteristic of the neoliberal consensus. Institutions insinuate themselves into people’s lives, shaping the way they think and the choices they make. Mandatory membership homeowner associations induce people to identify with a small neighborhood of people with similar social and economic characteristics, either by cooperating with the association or by opposing it. This is a kind of localized identity formation that otherwise might not happen. Some scholars, particularly those of communitarian leanings, like to think of this process as social capital formation, or as an embodiment of the “defensible space” theory, and some think it is a voluntary community. But my interpretation is that typically this institution gathers a group of affluent people together and forces them to think of themselves in relationship to the institution and the neighborhood it represents. It also locks them together economically to do things that otherwise local government would do. And, although developers started this institution, in the last decade state and local governments have taken the lead in promoting the spread of CID housing. What is the relationship of gated communities to this privatization process and the institution that is at its core? Taken together, these things—homeowner associations, privatization, and gated communities—resemble the construction of a is an ancient concept dating to pre-Roman times and used in the demarcation of Rome itself. The pomerium was not necessarily a real wall, although it had physical markers. It was a symbolic, sanctified boundary that separated civilization from barbarism, order from chaos, and civil peace from anarchy. The pomerium was, in essence, an imaginary line drawn around the spiritual city. PRACTICES: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS, SECURITY WALLS, AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN LAS VEGAS Las Vegas is the fastest growing city, in the fastest growing county, in the fastest growing state in the United States of America. The spread of CID housing as the dominant form of new residential development is especially dramatic in the Las Vegas area. Nearly all new construction is in planned residential subdivisions with homeowner association private governments. In order to maintain low taxes with an astronomical growth rate, Las Vegas and Clark County promote CID housing, which offers those who can afford it a range of privatized services, and minimizes demands on local government. As Gottdeiner observes, While master-planned communities have been criticized as being insular for isolating themselves from the surrounding community, that is exactly what many homebuyers want…In short, they seek services and protection they can no longer expect from municipal government. Thus, while some may criticize them as sterile, master-planned communities continue to be a great success in the Las Vegas region, where developers continue to build and sell thousands of homes per year. (Gottdeiner 1999, 153) While there is clearly a demand for such locations, their proliferation is no mere byproduct of market forces. The City of Las Vegas virtually mandates that new development be done with homeowner associations. This is a two-step process. First, the city’s Zoning Code and Development Code are administered to require that all new development contain certain features, including a landscaping plan, open spaces, and often security walls. Then, elsewhere in these codes, the city requires that if such features are included—which they must be—then there must be a homeowner association to maintain them. For example, in the following excerpt from Title 6 18 of the Las Vegas Zoning Code Section 18.12.5600, the word “shall” was recently substituted for the word “may” to provide as follows: 18.12.5600 Landscaping Plan as an integral part of subdivision design. Such a plan shall be prepared and submitted with each final map application addressing the landscape design of the subdivision with respect to such features as wall or fence design; land forms or berms; rocks and boulders; trees and plant materials; sculpture, art, paving materials, street furniture; and subdivision entrance statement; common area landscaping and other open space areas…Where common lots are shown for landscaping, the applicant shall cause the creation of a homeowners association for purposes of owning the common lot and maintaining the landscaping. The code further provides that “All walls, setback areas and landscaping created to accommodate these regulations shall be located on private property. If in common ownership, the property shall be owned and maintained by a Homeowner’s Association.” (Las Vegas Zoning Code, Section 18.12.570, subsection C. And Chapter 19 of the Zoning Code requiers that in Residential Planned Development Districts, “All development with 12 or more dwelling units shall provide 15 percent useable open space for passive and active recreational uses.” The City’s Urban Design Guidelines and Standards are similar, stating, “All required landscaping shall be properly maintained, based on standard landscaping practices, by the property owner(s) and/or supported by a perpetual Homeowner’s Association budget, or a reasonable alternative approved by the City.” I am informed by a representative of the Southern Nevada Builders’ Association that no such “reasonable alternative to an association has been approved to date. The same Guidelines and Standards provide that “Developers may provide and plant street medians on public and private streets as long as they are supported by a perpetual Homeowner’s Association.” And elsewhere, common open spaces, which must be HOA controlled are required: “Private and common open spaces are to be provided in Residential Planned Development Districts and in multi-family residential developments.” Title 19 of the city Zoning Code provides for HOA controlled private streets and gated entrances: “Subdivisions developed with private streets must have a mandatory property owners association which includes all property served by private streets. The association shall own and be responsible for the maintenance of private streets and appurtenances…The entrances to all private streets must be marked with a sign stating that it is a private street. Guard houses, access control gates and cross arms may be constructed.” (Chapter 19A.04). The nearby booming city of Henderson has similar requirements. First, the Planned Unit Development portions of the Development Code require landscaping: “Perimeter landscaping with a minimum depth of 25 feet shall be provided abutting all arterial streets with a width of 100 feet or more. Perimeter landscaping with a minimum depth of 20 feet shall be provided abutting all arterial streets with a width of less than 100 feet.” (Henderson Development Code, Sec. 19.5.4, p. 88). And, “common useable open space shall be provided in a central location readily accessible to all lots.” Then, the Code requires that, “All common areas shall be installed by the developer according to a schedule as approved by the City. Maintenance shall be the responsibility of a Property Owners’ Association.” The Code goes on to state as follows: 17. Property Owners Association Property Owners Association for the individual subdivision or be part of a Master Association. The Association shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of all 7 common areas as well as the enforcement of covenants and restrictions of the development.” (Henderson Development Code, Chapter 19.5.17) Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman was forced to respond to these “complaints that ordinances on the books since 1997 mandate all new subdivisions be structured as homeowner associations,” saying to angry builders and owners only that, “We can see if we can make some adjustments.” (City Life, 2000). But such adjustments are neither forthcoming nor likely. The City of Las Vegas not only requires HOAs in new development, but also encourages existing neighborhoods that do not have homeowner associations to form them. In 1998, the Las Vegas City Council unanimously approved a measure directing city staff to work with neighborhood “community associations” in “crafting plans to guide development” in the City (Zapler 1998) Through the Neighborhood Services Department, the City has induced over 150 different neighborhood associations to form (Gottdeiner 1999, 182). There is one other major ingredient driving the current political economy of Las Vegas, and that is the competition between the City of Las Vegas and Clark County for tourist dollars. Downtown Las Vegas, known as “Glitter Gulch,” was the home of the original Las Vegas casinos. But over the last twenty years, these casinos have been eclipsed by the construction of giant, spectacular “mega-casinos” on Las Vegas Boulevard, or “The Strip,” outside the city limits. These mega -casinos are close to downtown and closer to the major airport, but are in Clark County. They drain tourist revenue from the city, creating a uniquely intense version of the city-suburb competition for business that is typical of most American metro area. During the 1990s, the City of Las Vegas has fought back against the mega-casinos with a massive downtown redevelopment effort. Over one-half billion dollars in development funds are being channeled through the Center City Development Corporation (CCDC), a non-profit corporation that is a “private-public partnership” modeled after the entity use to redevelop downtown San Diego, California. And as in other downtown redevelopment efforts, the poor stand in the path of the City’s economic resurgence in its competition with the county. The City recently forced one of the area’s largest homeless shelters out of Las Vegas, denying it title to 10 acres of land it had been operating on, just north of downtown. As the Mayor and a city council member put it, "I don't want to see Las Vegas become the only center for the homeless in this valley," Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman said. "This is a problem that must be shared with the entire region." Las Vegas Councilman Lawrence Weekly said he doesn't want a "homeless Taj Mahal" built on the premises, where a shelter, medical clinic, crisis intervention facility and job counseling center have operated since the San Diego-based charity expanded to Las Vegas. (Moller 2001) Councilman Weekly’s ward includes not only the homeless “Taj Mahal” he spoke of so compassionately, but also Bonanza Village. As we shall see, the Bonanza Village episode illustrates the dynamics just described. CASE STUDY: THE BONANZA VILLAGE WALL Bonanza Village is a development of single family homes in what is known as the “West Side” of the City of Las Vegas. The development was established in 1946 with 168 lots. The area was at that time on the western edge of the city, bordering on the desert. But over the years the city has spread so far to the west that now the so-called West Side is actually located near the 8 center of the city. The West Side is the historically black area of Las Vegas, although in recent years there has been an influx of Hispanic residents. Bonanza Village is located about 1.5 miles northwest of downtown Las Vegas, or “Glitter Gulch,” the location of the original casinos that is currently undergoing large -scale redevelopment. Bonanza Village is bordered by four streets: on the north by Owens, on the east by Martin Luther King, Jr., on the south by Washington, and on the west by Tonopah. As originally constructed the development could be entered by automobile at five places from these public streets, from all four compass points. It was, and is, zoned “R-E,” or “Residential Estates.” This classification, sometimes called “horse lots,” bears the official description of providing for “low density residential units located on large lots and conveying a rural environment.” The lots are over half an acre in size. There were restrictive covenants, including a whites-only race restrictive covenant, recorded against the lots at the time of original construction, but, as was normal for that era, these covenants did not create a homeowner association to enforce them. There are no private streets or other “common area,” meaning property owned jointly by all residents. The covenants allow residents a great deal of latitude in the use of their land as long as it remains a single family dwelling. They are allowed to have various kinds of outbuildings including stables, guest or servants quarters, and greenhouses; grow crops for wholesale as long as they do not put up advertising signs; and have a “reasonable number” of animals, including dogs, cats, and horses, and up to twelve chickens and six rabbits Many of the houses in Bonanza Village were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and a substantial number are still occupied by the original owners. These are older people, many living on fixed incomes. But over the last two decades, there has been an influx of younger, more affluent residents to Bonanza Village. Presently, the development is more or less evenly divided between these two groups (Edwards 2000). The newer residents envision remaking Bonanza Village in the mold of the newer subdivisions, with a homeowner association, walls and a gate, and a high standard of property maintenance. Given the large lot sizes and proximity to the redeveloping downtown, they anticipate that a substantial increase in property values would result if they could make the property fit the expectations of home buyers like themselves—young, professional, and racially diverse. But older residents are accustomed to the freedom and the relaxed, near-rural lifestyle that Bonanza Village has always had, and they are fearful that they will lose their homes through the increase in property taxes and maintenance costs that could result from gentrification of their development. The dispute over the Bonanza Village wall is in large part a conflict between these two groups, and the wall came to symbolize the gentrified Bonanza Village envisioned by the newer residents and feared by the older ones. The dispute began in the early 1980s, and at every turn the wall advocates identified themselves as voluntary homeowner association. Efforts to close off Bonanza Village from the surrounding areas were in evidence as early as 1981, a group of residents calling themselves the Bonanza Village Homeowners Association successfully petitioned the City of Las Vegas to vacate four of the five intersections from which Bonanza Village could be entered, leaving only the entrance from Washington at Comstock on the south of the development. The city conditioned its surrender of these streets on the homeowner association installing “crash gates” at three of the vacated intersections and keeping them locked at all times but available for emergency access. These gates were never installed, and instead the association put concrete traffic barriers in place. The net result of this episode was that the city allowed the notional homeowner association to close the development to vehicle traffic except from the south. Pedestrians could still walk into the development at these intersections. Some residents protested the action, but to no avail (Null 1981; Hawley 1982; Ogilvie 1982). Much of Bonanza Village’s perimeter had been enclosed over the years by walls or fences erected by most of the 65 lot owners who lived on the perimeter of the development. With these barriers to entry, and the closed streets, there was enough security and separation from the 9 surrounding neighborhood and security for many residents. However, others were not satisfied with these measures and they began to campaign for construction of a full perimeter wall. In 1985, the Bonanza Village Homeowner Association—an unincorporated and voluntary organization--requested creation of a Special Improvement District in order to build a wall around the development. A letter from the association to the City Attorney in 1985 requested creation of an SID for “construction of a masonry wall on the perimeter of Bonanza Village at locations where said wall is non-existent.” The wall and SID, said the association, would produce “improved security of total Village area,” “improved property value,” “improved safety for all residents,” “environmental improvement (reduction of noise level; reduction of vehicle traffic,” and “better control of unwanted foot traffic” (Simon, et al., 1985). This effort failed. In 1990, a group of the newer residents attempted to secure passage of an amended set of deed restrictions which would have created a mandatory membership homeowner association for Bonanza Village. An incorporated association with power to enforce restrictive covenants would have been able to finance a wall with homeowner assessments and build a wall without petitioning the city to create a SID. However, the effort encountered sufficient opposition from other residents that it failed. Thereafter, the pro-gentrification residents returned to the earlier approach of using the voluntary homeowner association to petition the city for creation a special improvement district to finance the wall construction (Williams 2000). In 1997, the effort began to gain momentum. A new president of the Bonanza Village Homeowner Association—which was still not incorporated--introduced herself to the membership in January of that year and announced what would prove to be the pivotal event that would make the association’s wall a reality: the City of Las Vegas now wanted the wall to be constructed: I look forward to working together to make a reality that much talked about block wall. The City has re-committed itself to the block wall by assigning a full time staff person to help us achieve our goal. The individual will be working with us from the Neighborhood Preservation Office on Owens. This is a new and exciting development and shows a commitment we’ve never had before. There is much development going on around us as well as inside (There are two new homes currently under construction in the Village). As I see it, right now is the best time for all of us to pull together to get our wall completed. I truly hope that you will make a commitment to become more involved in improving Bonanza Village in 1997. Yes, it’s been difficult, yes, we’ve gone down this road before, but I say that’s no reason to stop trying! We as homeowners are responsible for what Bonanza Village looks like and what it is. If we really want to look better, IT’S UP TO US to clean it up. I’m willing to take responsibility for that and all I need is YOUR HELP. If the City doesn’t come through for us, I say we come up with another plan and do it ourselves! Let’s do more than talk, let’s work together to save Bonanza Village. WE CAN DO IT!. (underlining added; capitalization in original) (Phillips 1997) The City of Las Vegas was, indeed, now supporting the wall project, with the city councilman for Bonanza Village’s ward now pushing the project through. This time the project made sense to a city that was determined to redevelop and gentrify its downtown areas to keep pace with the County-based Strip. Bonanza Village lay within the West Side areas added in 1988 and 1996 to a special district called the Downtown Redevelopment Area. This district was receiving special treatment from the City through the Center City Development Corporation, a non-profit corporation that was coordinating half a billion dollars in downtown redevelopment efforts. The Bonanza Village wall, and other efforts to make the old neighborhood look like a contemporary gated community, were consistent with the City’s overall redevelopment campaign. The wall opponents were no longer just opposing a group of their own neighbors. They were now, literally, fighting city hall. The association notified the residents in April 1997 that, 10 [T]he city now appears to be eager to get this project completed. Councilman Reese is applying pressure to the department of public works and other city offices to make them “get on the stick” and quit procrastinating…A “special agent” has been appointed whose job it is to see that difficulties encountered in the planning and completion of the wall are quickly resolved…The department of public works has completed detailed drawings of the perimeter wall. The wall being planned will be 8 feet high. (Bonanza Village Homeowner Association 1997) This communiqué also revealed that the association’s plans for Bonanza Village’s makeover with the gated community image went beyond a mere eight foot wall: “We are planning to do something nice to the Comstock entrance as a part of the wall project…We would like to get some kind of nice sign out front saying Bonanza Village and there has been talk of a guard house being built in the island.” There were two kinds of homeowner approval needed. First was the requirement of Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 271 that SID creation be supported by a petition signed by 66.67 % of the owners who would be assessed. During 1997, the association went about the project gathering signatures on a petition to create the SID. The petition was drafted by the city for this purpose. There was major controversy over whether this requirement was satisfied, and anti-wall forces claimed the signatures had been collected over many years, were obtained with false information on the cost of the wall, included signators who no longer lived in the development, and included others who had changed their minds. By September, 2000, 86 complaints from anti-wall residents—a majority of the current residents of the development-- were sent to the state Ombudsman for Common Interest Communities. The complainants asserted that “their subdivision was illegally organized…without the homeowners’ knowledge,” and that the protesters “do not want to be represented by the Bonanza Village Homeowners Association” (Ashworth 2000). But the City and ultimately the courts decided that the petition requirement had been satisfied, regardless of these protests. However, there was another set of signatures needed. The chief impediment to what was now a joint effort of the City and the homeowner association proved to be the need to obtain easements over the 65 properties that lay on the perimeter of Bonanza Village, where the wall would be contructed. The City needed a permanent easement for the wall itself, and also a larger temporary construction easement, and these required intrusion on private property rights. The homeowner association worked to obtain signatures on both the SID petition and the easement documents. But ultimately 13 of these perimeter owners did not sign the easement documents in time, and this precipitated the litigation which eventually took the Bonanza Village case to the Nevada Supreme Court. The city set up an aggressive schedule for creating the SID and building the wall, all of which was to be done between February 1998 and February 1999. One of the items on the schedule was “Protest Disposal Resolution,” set for May 11, 1998. After the scheduled rejection of anticipated protests by city council resolution, the ordinance creating the SID was to receive its first public reading. (Bonanza Village Times 1998) The schedule had to be set back a bit, and the protests were not rejected until October 12, 1998. Then, the president and vice president of the Bonanza Village Homeowner Association addressed the Las Vegas City Council at a public hearing on September 28, 1998, to advocate for the wall project. They began by arguing that the wall was a crime prevention measure needed to prevent petty burglaries committed with shopping carts. The facts, which were no doubt known 11 to everybody in the room, were that the crime rate in Las Vegas was plummeting, paralleling a similar drop in crime rates across the nation. much more eloquent in portraying the wall as an esthetic measure that would make Bonanza Village look like other, newer, communities, and thereby make the neighborhood look like part of the downtown redevelopment. This, they said, would stimulate community pride and enhance property values. The president of the association spoke first (Las Vegas City Council 1998): Our reasons for wanting a security wall around Bonanza Village are the same reasons security walls have been and are currently being built, in fact, it seems to be the norm nowadays, in many Southern Nevada neighborhoods surrounding ours, like Summerlin, Green Valley, The Lakes, and Rancho Circle. We want to discourage crime; namely, petty burglaries that occur on foot with the aid of a shopping cart. It’s hard to push a shopping cart filled with a television or a lawn mower through a block wall, but this is the kind of crime that is occurring in our neighborhood. So, like our surrounding neighbors, we wish to deter these crimes as well as protect our investments. We want to maintain a sense of neighborhood pride and improve the appearance of the whole area. Just like those other homeowners, we expect certain improvements for our tax dollars. Further because we are one of the oldest neighborhoods in Southern Nevada, meaning we have been paying taxes for a longer time, we need to know that the City has not turned its back on us because of the new kids on the block. Bonanza Village lies smack dead in the middle of a major downtown redevelopment that we want to be a part of. There is the Fourth Street Corridor project under way, the old Union pacific Railroad land that now has a beautiful new County building in place, and right on Bonanza the old Dula City Swimming Pool is being brought back to life. Why should our neighborhood be left behind? The approval of the SID will breathe new life into the Martin Luther King/Washington/Vegas Drive area with the building of a security wall and will serve as an example for others in our area to show what neighborhood pride can do and make— can be done to revitalize an old and impoverished area. It will stimulate neighborhood pride and make Bonanza Village a part of the new downtown. The president was followed by the association vice president, who added to her comments, noting among other things that the city—not the association--had prepared the petition that the HOA circulated to obtain the signatures needed to proceed with the SID, and then proceeding to advocate for the wall purely because it would make Bonanza Village look like nearby gated communities: There is some new development that’s happening in our area that we’re excited about. The Andre Agassi Boys and Girls Club looks really good. The Veterans Hospital close by us looks good. There’s a new Post Office going in. And also there’s a subdivision that has planted itself north of us. It’s single family homes and they have a really nice wall running along Vegas Drive. Now all these good looking projects, when they look across the road or into our area, they see what typical horse zoned property, the back side, lots of typical horse zoned property looks like. It’s a mish-mash of different fencing. Sometimes you’re not going to put your lumber pile in the front yard if you got a half acre. That’s one of the reasons you own it is so that you can have a few things other than just landscaping. And so a lot of that stuff winds up in the back yards… The project is not only good for Bonanza Village, but it’s good for the City. If we do not build this wall, Bonanza Village will fall behind the level of the new developments coming into our area and we don’t want that. We’re an inner-city neighborhood that’s willing to spend our own money to bring itself up to the level of the new stuff that’s moving in around us. 12 A third wall supporter made the case even more bluntly, saying, “Today we would like to see Bonanza Village in the same capacity as any other gated community.” Those who objected to the wall spoke at this hearing as well, but in the minds of many the outcome was a foregone conclusion. Five weeks later, on November 9, 1998, Special Improvement District 1463 was created. The degree to which the City was willing to overlook obstacles in its rush to build the wall was illustrated by an indemnity agreement which was entered into on that date between the City of Las Vegas and the Bonanza Village Homeowners’ Association, “a Nevada corporation.” In fact, the association was not incorporated, and did not incorporate until nearly a year and a half later, on April 7, 2000, with a grand total of 22 members. But this minor matter—that the city was entering into a contract with an organization that had no corporate existence—did not stop the City. The indemnity agreement set out the arrangement for financing, building, and maintaining the wall. Bonanza Village became Special Improvement District No. 1463 for purposes of building the wall. All property owners within the development were to pay equal shares for construction of the wall, pursuant to state statute. Other documents show that the brown, eight-foot high, cinder block wall—two miles of it in all-- was expected to cost over $800,000, and that each lot would be assessed over $5000 to pay for it (the final cost to be determined after the wall was built), with up to ten years to pay the principal and interest. After the wall was constructed, the association was to be fully responsible for maintaining the wall, and the association also agreed to defend and indemnify the City against any claims made arising from the existence of the wall. The president of the association signed the indemnification agreement for “Bonanza Village Homeowners Association, Inc.”—the corporation which did not exist—as did the Mayor Pro-Tem on behalf of the City of Las Vegas. But, remarkably, the indemnification agreement was then recorded against every lot in Bonanza Village, as though it were a mandatory membership organization that spoke for all residents, when in fact it was voluntary and even as late as 2000 only had 22 members. This raised the possibility in the minds of many owners that they would become individually responsible for liability under the indemnification agreement, given the fact that the voluntary homeowner association had no way to raise money except by asking for it from residents and hoping for the best. Later, on the Fourth of July of the year 2000, a Bonanza Village homeowner would write to City Councilman Larry Weekly, the new representative for their ward, to point out the problem of the non-existent association, and to ask, “Doesn’t the City require documentation that a Homeowners Association is a Bona -Fide one before awarding $825,000 for an SID?” After some six weeks had passed, one of Weekly’s employees passed the letter on for reply to the Supervisor of the Special Improvement District, who responded with breathtaking cynicism, writing that “The fact that a homeowner association exists in a neighborhood has nothing to do with the SID process. Their only involvement in this case was to walk the petition around to get the supporting signatures to start the process.” (Thompson 2000) Armed with the Special District legislation and the indemnification agreement with the association, the City proceeded against the Bonanza Village perimeter residents who had not granted the City easements over their property. Foremost among these was Cuthbert Mack, an attorney. Mack and other opponents of the wall continued to organize and fight against the wall. When it became clear that a number of perimeter property owners would not voluntarily sign away the easements, the city decided to exercise eminent domain and take their property. June 28, 1999, the City Council authorized filing complaints in eminent domain against the recalcitrant owners, and on October 19, 1999, the case of City of Las Vegas v. Mack, Case No. A410116, was filed in the Clark County District Court. Mack’s argument was that the City lacked authority to take his property for the wall project, and the eminent domain action violated the Due Process Clauses of the Unites States and Nevada Constitutions. His central contention was that there was in reality no public use involved, 13 and that his property was being taken by the City for a what amounted to a private use. He also argued that there was no objective need for the wall, there was no need to take his property to construct a wall, and that the City had failed to follow the statutory requirements for SID creation, including lack of notice. (City of Las Vegas v. Mack, Case No. A410116, Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 2, lines 13-19). In a separate suit (Mack v. Bonanza Village Homeowners Association , Case No. A421503) Mack also requested an injunction to stop construction of the wall until the case could be fully adjudicated, as well as declaratory relief. On January 31, 2000, the District Court denied Mack’s motion to dismiss the eminent domain complaint. On April 8, Mack petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. On May 3, the City awarded the wall construction contract to a builder, but on June 16, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order staying the project until it could consider the merits of the case. It was at this point that the City revealed just how determined it was to build the wall. The City took the position that the Supreme Court’s order only applied to the Mack property, and not the rest of the development. The City ordered the contractor to proceed with the construction, and so they did. Existing fences and walls were bulldozed, trenches were dug, temporary chain - link fencing was erected, and piles of cinder blocks and rebar were stacked all around Bonanza Village. Fire hydrants, water main valves, and telephone poles that serviced Bonanza Village were walled out of the development. On July 25, Mack requested a contempt citation from the Supreme Court to punish the City for violating the order. On August 3, the Supreme Court issued another order reaffirming the earlier one, and making it clear that the order to stop construction applied to the entire project. At this point, the City halted the project. The Supreme Court made it’s third and final ruling in the case on March 15, 2001, denying Mack’s request for a writ of prohibition. The court ruled that Mack had failed to file a timely written objection to the SID as required by NRS 271.305, and therefore had waived his right to object and did not have standing to challenge the formation of the district. On the merits of his claim, the court held that: [T]he district court did not exceed its jurisdiction by denying petitioners’ motion to dismiss the City of Las Vegas’ eminent domain complaint because the right of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, the express provisions of NRS Chapter 37 and 271 authorize the City to condemn property for local improvements, and a security wall is defined as a local improvement pursuant to NRS 271.203. Thus, the City’s formation of a special improvement district (SID) and its efforts to condemn petitioners’ property for purposes of constructing a security wall are not unconstitutional (Order Denying Petition for Writ of Prohibition, Mack v. Eighth Judicial District, Case No. 36091; underlining added). The underlined language reflects a provision of Nevada law which specifically defines a security wall as a “local improvement,” so that the City was not required to produce any further justification—a security wall is, City in a case involving a special improvement district, the court was upholding a heavy, express, legislative presumption in favor of the validity of such projects. The relevant provisions of Nevada law made this clear: NRS 271.020 Legislative declaration. determination: 1. That providing for municipalities to which this chapter appertains the purposes, powers, duties, rights, disabilities, privileges, liabilities and immunities herein provided 14 will serve a public use and will promote the health, safety, prosperity, security and general welfare of the inhabitants thereof and of the State of Nevada. 2. That the acquisition, improvement, equipment, maintenance and operation of any project herein authorized is in the public interest, is conducive to the public welfare, and constitutes a part of the established and permanent policy of the State of Nevada. 3. That the necessity for this chapter is a result of the large population growth and intense residential, commercial and industrial development in the incorporated and unincorporated areas of portions of the state and of the ensuing need for extensive local improvements therein. 4. That the legislature recognizes the duty of municipalities as instruments of state government to meet adequately the needs for such facilities within their boundaries, in cooperation with the state, counties and districts within the state. 5. That for the accomplishment of these purposes, the provisions of this chapter shall be broadly construed, and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall have no application to this chapter. 6. That the notices herein provided are reasonably calculated to inform each interested person of his legally protected rights. 7. That the rights and privileges herein granted and the duties, disabilities and liabilities herein provided comply in all respects with any requirement or limitation imposed by any constitutional provision. (Added to NRS by 1965, 1349) NRS 271.025 Decision of governing body prima facie evidence of correctness. chapter, the action and decision of a municipality’s governing body as to all matters passed upon by it in relation to any action, matter or thing provided in this chapter is, in the absence of fraud, prima facie evidence of its correctness. (Added to NRS by 1965, 1349; A 1991, 1872) And, as the court noted, security walls were specifically listed among the projects to be given presumptive approval as public improvements: NRS 271.265 General powers of cities, counties and towns. 1. The governing body of a county, city or town, upon behalf of the municipality and in its name, without any election, may from time to time acquire, improve, equip, operate and maintain, within or without the municipality, or both, within and without the municipality: (a) A commercial area vitalization project; (b) A curb and gutter project; (c) A drainage project; (d) An offstreet parking project; (e) An overpass project; (f) A park project; (g) A sanitary sewer project; (h) A security wall; (i) A sidewalk project; (j) A storm sewer project; (k) A street project; (l) A street beautification project; (m) A transportation project; (n) An underpass project; 15 (o) A water project; and (p) Any combination of such projects. The statute further defines the term “security wall” so as to encompass any wall intended to protect residents from “vandalism”: NRS 271.203 “Security wall” defined. stone, brick, concrete, concrete blocks, masonry or similar building material, together with footings, pilasters, outriggers, grillwork, gates and other appurtenances, constructed around the perimeter of a residential subdivision with respect to which a final map has been recorded pursuant to in the subdivision and their occupants from vandalism. (Added to NRS by 1983, 870) The statute even defines exactly how SID funded security walls are to be paid for. The legislation states that walls benefit all residents equally, so payment is to be equal: NRS 271.367 Apportionment of assessments for security wall. afforded by a security wall benefits each tract in the subdivision, in addition to any other basis for apportioning the assessments authorized in the governing body may apportion the assessments for a security wall on the basis that all tracts in the subdiv ision share equally in the cost and maintenance of the project. (Added to NRS by 1983, 871) With this Supreme Court decision, all opposition to the Bonanza Village wall was effectively crushed, and the City resumed construction of the wall. In a stroke of great irony, the homeowners’ association also obtained a grant from the City to put up a sign at its one remaining entrance, where the anticipated gate and guard house will be built. The sign is a rock bearing the legend “Bonanza Village, Est. 1946.” The sign invokes the long heritage of the community, symbolizing the original Bonanza Village, where residents lived as they chose at the edge of the desert, with horses, chickens, sheds, and crops. This was the very Bonanza Village that the new residents wanted to eradicate, and the homeowner association that erected the sign was their most important instrument for doing so. That the sign was paid for by the city that bulldozed the entire perimeter of the area compounds the irony. The sign commodif ies the area’s semi-rural heritage as a selling point for a neighborhood well on its way to becoming another gated, walled, and homeowner association controlled subdivision, against the will of many if not most of its residents. As of this writing, Cuthbert Mack was about to lose his home in foreclosure for refusing to pay his share of the cost for the wall. Mack and 35 other residents did not pay, and their homes thus became subject to foreclosure by the city. In Mack’s case, the amount for which he was willing to lose his home over this issue was a paltry $1391. (Couzens 2003) This episode is replete with ironies and contradictions. It shows the suburbanization of cities, with institutions such as homeowner associations, that were invented to facilitate suburban secession, becoming a tool for urban redevelopment as well. The rhetoric of government responding the wishes of its citizen is used to legitimize and obscure the fact that it is suing them to take their land. The contract with a corporation that didn’t exist suggests that the incorporated homeowner association is so central to this type of activity that the city willed it into existence. And the ultimate irony may be that a development that was created with restrictive covenants to 16 keep out African-Americans is now run by African-Americans who are fighting to keep out the riffraff, using new tools of exclusion that are far more sophisticated than race restrictive covenants. In City of Walls , Teresa Caldeira writes, All fortified enclaves share some basic characteristics. They are private property for collective use, and they emphasize the value of what is private and restricted at the same time that they devalue what is public and open in the city. They are physically demarcated and isolated by wall, fences, empty spaces, and design devices. They are turned inward, away from the street, whose public life they explicitly reject…they belong not to their immediate surrounding but to largely invisible networks…Finally, the enclaves tend to be socially homogeneous environments…Fortified enclaves confer status. (Caldeira 2000, 258) What Caldeira found to be true in Sao Paolo could have been written of Bonanza Village. The affluent residents who are transforming their neighborhood into a fortified enclave, and the city officials that did the work for them, are part of the invisible network of professionals who understand the significance of secure residential compounds. The drive to wall-in Bonanza Village was an attempt to enhance the status of the development and raise its property values. While lip service was paid to crime prevention, the truth was that the residents who formed the Bonanza Village Homeowner Association were seeking status. In this respect, they were merely emulating their counterparts in the developer-created homeowner associations all around them. And the city, speaking the same language, saw the value of imposing the wall on the community’s recalcitrant residents. Higher property values mean higher property tax revenues, and the wall, it was felt, would make Bonanza Village a neighborhood whose appearance would contribute to the overall ambience of the redeveloping downtown area. In this context, it must have seemed an easy choice to exercise eminent domain, take people’s property from them by lawsuit and force, bulldoze their fences and yards, and even disregard a direct order from the state Supreme Court. The overriding consideration, it seems, was to extend the pomerium around this piece of real estate, to embrace these 168 lots within the arms of the sanctified, symbolic wall that separates civilization from barbarism, civil peace from chaos, and us from them. And underlying the rhetorical superstructure of community betterment and neighborhood empowerment, what happened at Bonanza Village exposes the new architecture of control that polices this boundary. This apparatus is comprised of special districts, homeowner associations, private-public partnerships and other special purpose, hybrid creations—a fusion of sta te, market, and civil society in which the categories and concepts of liberal democracy are irrelevant and alien. REGULATION: URBAN RESTRUCTURING, BAD PRESS, HOMEOWNER NETWORKING AND STATE REGULATION Private communities are for the most part free to operate within the limits of their governing documents, with little outside interference. They are largely unregulated. Federal policy regarding housing is for the most part promotional, in the sense that the federal government has for at least 75 years worked, successfully, to increase the home ownership rate in the US. Since the early 1960s the Federal Housing Administration and other federal entities have also promoted the growth of common interest housing. But at the state level, the policies 17 are often, and increasingly, more regulatory in nature. There are also other forces at work in the press and among rebellious homeowners that sometimes curtail the actions of homeowner associations. To place these emerging regulatory regimes in context it is important to first consider the place private residential governance plays in the contemporary debate over the nature of urban governance. I consider this issue in more detail elsewhere (McKenzie 2003). URBAN RESTRUCTURING There is a debate going on among urban policy scholars, professionals, activists, and policy makers concerning the nature and scale of governance in American metropolitan areas. Private gated communities play an important role in this debate. It is impossible to do justice to the entire war of ideas, but I can sketch out the basic contours of the conflict and show how and why the topic of this conference relates to it so significantly. In my view, the intellectual and ideological struggle of which I speak is best characterized as the “centralizers” versus the “decentralizers.” There are three dominant themes in this struggle: the first is, of course, centralization against decentralization; the second is public governance versus private governance; and the third is segregation versus integration. In more specific terms the two camps are polarized over a range of issue areas as follows: Advocacy coalition THE CENTRALIZERS THE DECENTRALIZERS Mainspring Activist government Private initiative Sanctified value Equality Liberty Choice mechanism Collective choice Individual choice Legitimizer Democracy Contract Faith in Government Markets Buzzword Smart growth Voluntary city Against what? Anti-sprawl Anti-government Utopia Regional government Suburban autonomy Preferred type of government General purpose governments Special districts and private gated communities The centralizers are exemplified by Myron Orfield (2002), David Rusk (1993), and Peter Dreier, et al. (2001), who argue that the existing system of municipal governance is bad for cities and suburbs alike, producing chaotic and competitive politics that pit municipalities against each other in a struggle to acquire affluent homeowners and businesses and exclude the poor. The outcome, the centralizers argue, is sprawl, segregation, and inequality. They advocate for the creation of powerful regional governments with broad control over planning, land use, transportation, and other functions. The decentralizers believe in the economic logic of Robert Nozick and others who favor individual choices and market mechanisms over collective choice manifested through large-scale general purpose governments (see Beito 2002). Private gated communities are often cited as examples of successful decentralization of government functions and regardless of whether one accepts the verdict that they are successful, it is beyond serious question that such housing developments are a new and highly decentralized level of the American intergovernmental system. Much of the time these two advocacy coalitions argue about abstractions, but in the rise of common interest housing there is a real-life test of one coalition’s dreams and the others predicted nightmare. If common interest housing continues to expand, and if homeowner associations are, by and large, able to perform their quasi governmental functions competently, the decentralizers would have a powerful argument to support their other proposals. But if the market for private gated communities were to fail, or if associations collapse due to financial and administrative mismanagement, the centralizers would have support for their argument that higher levels of government are better. These communities are busy conducting their own internal functions without any awareness of the part they play in this intellectual and policy debate, but those who write about them are ever conscious of the stakes. BAD PRESS: FLAGS, FAT DOGS, AND FORECLOSURES Adverse publicity is a threat to private communities because it discourages potential buyers and thus has the potential to undercut the property value -maximization that is their guiding light. Yet often associations seem to court bad press, which has risen to a crescendo since September 11, 2001, as one association after another has taken residents to court over flying the American flag in violation of association rules. Presently, the most highly publicized case is that of George Andres of Jupiter, Florida. The Indian Creek Phase 3B Homeowners Association recently won a protracted legal battle against Andres, a US Marine Corps veteran, who erected a flagpole on his lawn in violation of the association’s rules. He now faces the loss of his home in foreclosure if he keeps the pole and fails to pay the association’s legal fees, amounting to some $21,000, but he remains adamant. Conservative talk show hosts Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity have featured Andres’ plight, Florida governor Jeb Bush personally delivered an American flag to him, along with signing into law a bill passed by the state legislature that retroactivelyh legalizes what Andres was doing. But this did not dissuade the association or the local judge, who ruled that the lien for attorney fees was filed before the law became effective and remains in force. The ruling, delivered with incredibly bad timing the day before the two year anniversary of 9/11/01, received national attention. The fate of Andres and his flagpole remains in doubt as of this writing. (Franceschina 2003) But incidents such as this, as well as actual and fictional events depicted on episodes of ABC’s 20/20, The X Files and other popular programs, and even the comic strip Doonesbury, portray associations in a negative light. This tends to undermine the market appeal of the product and serves as a check on association activity. The connection between highly publicized abuses of individuals and quick reaction by opportunistic state legislators is becoming sufficiently clear that even industry partisans must begin to understand the need for caution. HOMEOWNER NETWORKING There is an increasingly vocal and organized homeowner rights movement. This is fueled by several convergent forces. First, the internet has enabled what was once a disaggregated rabble to share ideas, circulate information about legislation, and organize for political action. Second, there are now many newspaper reporters with some understanding of this industry and some sympathy for aggrieved owners who have no place to turn. The connection between owner rights groups and sympathetic reporters empowers the owners still further. Third, the high level of litigation generated by HOA enforcement actions is costly to the public treasury and leads to legislatures at least listening to owners who previously were dismissed as eccentrics. On the Commons is a weekly internet radio program produced by Shu Bartholomew, a long-time homeowner rights activist. ( hour each Saturday afternoon interviewing politicians, professionals, academics, and owners on this topic. Her listeners can quickly become educated about this form of housing and the prospects for reform around the country. 19 There are many other web sites, Yahoo groups, and other focal points on the web for HOA activists, and their impact can only be expected to increase. STATE REGULATION Bad press, owner activism, and costly litigation are all incentives for enterprising state legislators to get involved with these issues. There are many bills floating through the halls of several state legislatures as of this writing. Three states—California, Nevada, and New Jersey-- illustrate the main trends visible across the nation. In California, the courts and the state legislature have long been at odds. A number of recent California Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the authority of homeowner association boards over their residents, but the state legislature has often enacted reform measures indicating a concern for abuses of owner rights by their boards. As recently as the last few weeks, the state legislature was imposing detailed regulations on association activity (records, elections, rule changes, and so forth) that resemble those applicable to local governments. Some in the industry fear that these regulations are a sort of micro-management that will make it impossible for associations to function with unpaid, untrained, volunteer directors. Lurking in the wings there is also a comprehensive reform effort run by the California Law Revision Commission, an advisory body that could propose more sweeping changes. But all of this lacks any enforcement mechanism, so that the courts become the actual regulatory arm of government. In Nevada, the legislature has taken a different approach of late and has tried to offer aggrieved owners something they have never had: a government official to talk to. After passing reform legislation as in California and feeling that more needed to be done, the legislature first created the office of Ombudsman for fielding complaints from owners. When the office became deluged with cases, the legislature took a bolder step and created the Nevada Commission for Common Interest Communities. This entity, which came into existence only a few months ago, could if successful offer an approach that other states may emulate, but it is far too early to know. New Jersey is the site of a third approach. The Rutgers University Law School has a Constitutional Litigation Clinic headed by prominent civil liberties attorney Frank Askin. Askin, aided by the New Jersey chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, has launched a major legal assault on the protected private status of homeowner associations. The case, involving the Twin Rivers development, argues that some HOAs are sufficie ntly government-like in their functions that they should be held accountable to the civil liberties protections of the New Jersey state constitution. This case (in which I serve as an expert witness for the owners challenging the association’s actions) could prove to be a major event if the New Jersey Supreme Court accepts Askin’s arguments. WILD CARDS The future of common interest housing and private gated communities could be determined in large part by some political wild cards. Many people believe that most of these communities have insufficient reserve funds to make necessary repairs when major building components wear out, let alone when director or manager incompetence or malfeasance produce major financial liabilities. Cities, insurance companie s, and real estate developers have become increasingly clever at finding ways to insulate themselves from these costs. That means that owner themselves often find themselves forced to pay large special assessments on pain of losing their homes in foreclosure. If the pace of such unanticipated cost assessments increases, as seems virtually certain, this could become a political issue that might change the regulatory picture dramatically in unforeseen ways. Will there be, for example, a reclaiming of these private 20 communities by the state? Or will they be allowed to succeed or fail like a Darwinian experiment? A related issue is the possibility of increased homeowner activism in the form of electoral protest, as happened in 1978 with the celebrated property tax revolt in California. As the Terminator, Arnold Schwarzenegger, looms on the horizon as possibly the next governor of California, riding on a tsunami of voter rage at big government, high taxation, and the death of the California Dream, it is im possible to foreclose any possibility. What can be said with certainty is that the future of American urban areas cannot be charted without taking into account the private communities that have become the home of choice for millions. REFERENCES Ashworth, M. 2000. Letter from State Ombudsman for Common Interest Communities to Christine Monroe, Subject: Bonanza Village. September 15. Beito, D., et al., (eds.) The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Blakely, E, and M. Snyder. 1997. Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. Bonanza Village Homeowners’ Association. 1997. Block Wall Update. April. Bonanza Village Times, 1998. Special Notice. February 25. Caldeira, T. 2000. City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in Sao Paulo. Berkeley: University of California. CityLife. 2000. Private government: Mayor jumps into fray over homeowners associations. March 30. Couzens, F. 2003. Bonanza Village owner gets TRO in SID payment dispute. Las Vegas Tribune (on line edition) August 8. Dreier, P., et al. 2001. Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-first Century. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. Edwards, J. 2000. Building fences: controversy stirs an enduring neighborhood. Las Vegas Review Journal. July 9. Franceschina, P. 2003. Media focusing on flagpole fight. South Florida Sun-Sentinel (on line edition). September 13. Gottdeiner, M., et al.1999. Las Vegas: The Social Production of an All-American City. Oxford: Blackwell. Hawley, C. 1982. Memorandum re citizens’ complaint, Bonanza Village street vacations, from City Clerk of Las Vegas. June 7. Las Vegas City Council 1998. City Council Minutes. September 28. 21 McKenzie, E. 1994. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government. New Haven: Yale University Press. McKenzie, E. 1998a. Homeowner associations and California politics: an exploratory analysis. Urban Affairs Review McKenzie, E. 1998b. Reinventing common interest developments: Reflections on a policy role for the judiciary. 31 John Marshall Law Review 397-427. Winter. Vol. 31, No. 2. McKenzie, E. 2003. Common Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow. ¨Housing Policy Debate, forthcoming. Moller, J. 2001. Council delays decision: fate of shelter will be decided in two weeks. Las Vegas Review-Journal. April 19. Null, H. 1981. Letter to Bonanza Village Homeowners Association from Chief of Planning of City of Las Vegas. September 14. Ogilvie, G. 1982. Letter regarding Bonanza Village street vacations to City Attorney of Las Vegas. May 7. Orfield, M. 2002. American Metropolitics: The New Suburban Reality (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Phillips, J. 1997. Letter to Bonanza Village residents. January. Rusk, D. 1993. Cities Without Suburbs. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center. Simon, H., et al. 1985. Letter from Bonanza Village Homeowne r Association to City Attorney George Ogilvie. August 22. Thompson, M. 2000. Letter to Christine Monroe re Bonanza Village Security Wall. August 14. Wills, L. 2000. Trouble in paradise: residents of a pastoral old Las Vegas neighborhood are fighting over an expensive plan to keep out the riffraff. CityLife. July 13. Zapler, M. 1998. “Neighborhood growth measure OK’d. Las Vegas Review-Journal. March 10. 22 ENDNOTES 1 arrangement for local governments. CID owners pay their full property tax bill, and also their monthly association assessments. But the assessments pay for services such as snow and leaf removal, trash collection, and street lighting and maintenance, that duplicate much of what they have already supported with their property tax payment. New Jersey has a state law which provides for some equalization of this tax burden, but other states have not yet done so, and it remains an issue which has been discussed but not resolved in Nevada and other states. 2 organization that engaged in the subsequent wall efforts described in this paper. It appears to have been organized around issues pertaining to the neighborhood elementary school on the southwest corner of Bonanza Village. Its membership included areas outside Bonanza Village, all Bonanza Elementary School teachers were made honorary members, and the principal office of the corporation was the address of the elementary school. The incorporation papers describe the corporation’s purposes as to “provide neighborhood protection,” “improve relationship between the Bonanza Elementary School and the Community,” “promote neighborhood beautification, maintenance, and improvement of property,” “support youth activities and recreation within the community,” and “improve public relations within the community boundaries and with other civic and political entities.” This organization’s corporate status was permanently revoked on August 29, 1995. 3 and also a place for school children to wait for the bus, because school buses in Clark County do not enter gated communities and children must go to the entrance of the community to be picked up. 4 when the wall project began to gain momentum. For Las Vegas, the Metropolitan Police report that between 1995 and 2000, there was an overall drop in property crimes of almost 38%, including a 40% reduction in burglary. 5 6 conduce extensive work at Bonanza Village. The project includes, among other things, “installation of 31 new fire hydrant assemblies.” The engineer’s estimate for the project was over $1.6 million.